

SECURITY
N.B. The grade
UPGRADE

Contents checked
for transfer to
DRO

(Sgd.)

Date

YEAR
STAMP

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

NEAR EASTERN

(134-169)

FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1 (Part C)

TITLE: POLITICAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME
(and dept, where necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept, where necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept, where necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

FILE

17/1541



Registry Address

SECURITY
N.B. The grade
UPGRADE

YEAR STAMP

1971

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PART

FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1

*The Minister
for
Foreign Affairs*

Stockholm, December 8, 1971

134

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 14 DEC 1971 NEQ 3/528/1
--

Your Excellency,

With reference to your letter of December 2, 1971, I have the honour to inform you that the Swedish Government, after having obtained the consent of the Government of Iraq, has agreed to assume the protection of British interests in Iraq following the severance of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Iraq and the United Kingdom.

I trust that necessary administrative arrangements can be worked out shortly.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

*Yours sincerely
Krister Wickman*

Krister Wickman

His Excellency Mr Guy Elwin Millard
Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
etc., etc., etc.,

STOCKHOLM

mb

*The Minister
for
Foreign Affairs*

Stockholm, December 8, 1971

X (134)

Your Excellency,

With reference to your letter of December 2, 1971, I have the honour to inform you that the Swedish Government, after having obtained the consent of the Government of Iraq, has agreed to assume the protection of British interests in Iraq following the severance of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Iraq and the United Kingdom.

I trust that necessary administrative arrangements can be worked out shortly.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

*Yours sincerely
Krister Wickman*

Krister Wickman

His Excellency Mr Guy Elwin Millard
Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
etc., etc., etc.,

STOCKHOLM

ph

2 December 1971

3/18

Herr Krister Wickman
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Stockholm

Monsieur le Ministre,

On the instructions of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, I have the honour to enquire whether Sweden would be prepared to act as protecting power for the United Kingdom in Iraq in view of the severance of diplomatic relations by the Republic of Iraq with the United Kingdom.

If, as I venture to hope, the Government of Sweden will be agreeable to this proposal, details of the administrative arrangements will be communicated by Her Majesty's Government as soon as possible.

I take this opportunity to renew to you, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my highest consideration.

G E Millard

3/18



With the compliments of
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
~~EMBASSY~~
CHANCERY

NR 10/12/71.

BRITISH EMBASSY
STOCKHOLM

Tel/IC

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

File No. CRE 1146

Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

14 DEC 1971

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Restricted

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~URGENT~~
~~EXTRA~~
~~PRIORITY~~
Routine

(Date) 9 December 1971

Despatched

NEQ 3/10/1

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

[Security classification
—if any]

RESTRICTED

09 17 102

[Privacy marking
—if any]

~~Code~~
Cypher

[Codeword—if any] POLITICAL

Addressed to DUBAI

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to PRODRONE KUWAIT

Saving to

Draft Telegram to:—

DUBAI
No. CREDA 19
(Date) - 9 DEC 1971

And to:—

Repeat to:—

KUWAIT

Saving to:—

Distribution:—
Mr J Ashwood,
R.301

Copies to:—
Mr B Smith,
Near East Dept.
FCO

c. 2.

Text: (to be typed with double spacing)
FROM ASHWOOD. YOUR CREDA 38.

PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL FUNCTION AT BRITISH EMBASSY UNDER SWEDISH PROTECTION. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT SMALL COMMERCIAL STAFF WILL CONTINUE IN COMMERCIAL OFFICE. THE SERVICE TO BRITISH VISITORS WILL NECESSARILY BE RESTRICTED BUT VISITORS CAN OF COURSE EXPECT SOME MEASURE OF ASSISTANCE. AT PRESENT, WE KNOW OF NO DEVELOPMENTS LIKELY TO RESTRICT BUSINESS VISITORS BUT SUGGEST PARTY SHOULD CHECK AT KUWAIT AT LATER DATE WHERE, PROVIDING THE IRAQIS HAVE SORTED THEMSELVES OUT, HE WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO APPLY FOR AN IRAQI VISA. WE ARE INFORMED THAT, AT PRESENT, THE IRAQI CONSUL IN KUWAIT HAS INSTRUCTED THAT NO VISAS FOR IRAQ SHOULD BE ISSUED TO BRITISH NATIONALS. WE HAVE ASKED BAGHDAD TO CHECK WITH IRAQIS IF THIS IS THE CASE.

Signature of Originator

u/c .

Miss V. BECKETT
Near Eastern Dept

F Co.



With the compliments of
**HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY**

(Miss P. M. Hutchinson).

**BRITISH EMBASSY
STOCKHOLM**


13 . 12 . 71.

RESTRICTED

Mr Egerton ✓

~~Mr Parsons~~

Mr Parsons



IRAQ

1. The negotiations with the Swedes over their agreement to protect our interests in Iraq are almost complete. The only outstanding point is the drawing up of an Iraq/Swedish agreement on which the Swedish Ambassador and Mr Lewty are working in Baghdad.
2. I think therefore that the time has come for us to thank the Embassy in Stockholm for all the work they have put into this exercise. I submit a draft letter from Mr Parsons to Mr Millard.
3. Mr Parsons may also wish to consider asking the Swedish Ambassador to call on him in order to thank him for his Government's co-operation.

Veronica Beckett

Miss V E Beckett
Near Eastern Department

13 December 1971

I think I
might have
a word with
him even so
AD 14/12

I doubt if we need call
in the Swedish Ambassador. The
Swedes are used to affording this
service and we reimburse them
for it.

St Egerton 13/xii
pub

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

137

Miss P M Hutchinson
Stockholm

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 3/548/1

Date 14 December 1971

Dear Patricia,

IRAQ

134

1. Thank you for your letter of 8 December.
2. I confirm that British Council in Baghdad will be in a similar position to that of any British firm there. The Swedes would of course have consular responsibility for the British Council personnel, as they would for the representatives of a British firm in Baghdad; but they would have no other special legal responsibilities.
3. I can also confirm that in any negotiations with the Iraqis there should be provisions for replacement if a member of the British Interests Section were to fall ill or were to be transferred for any other reason (see paragraph 10 of the Algerian Note of 21 March 1966 of which I sent you a copy last week). Would Ian Lewty in Baghdad, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, please ensure that this is done.
4. On Basra, you are perfectly right that you did check with me about this and that I said the Swedes would have no special responsibilities there. This is indeed the case: we have no premises in Basra for which the Swedes will be responsible. As for Mr Padyath, his precise status remains unclear; but he is, as you know, being brought back to Baghdad where he will become a member of the locally engaged staff.

Yours ever,

Veronica

Veronica Beckett

Copy to: D I Lewty Esq, Baghdad

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

c.c. Mr COB Stewart (ORD)
Mr CW Long (POD)
Mr JH Kemble (ASD)
Mr N Young (PSD)

pb

CONFIDENTIAL

138

930.8440 Ext.455

His Excellency
Mr G E Millard CMG CVO,
Stockholm

14 December 1971

IRAQ

1. Seen from Stockholm in winter, Baghdad must seem very remote.
2. It is therefore with all the more admiration that we have followed the way in which your Embassy has handled the negotiations with the Swedes over the future of our Interests Section in Baghdad. Speed, as you know, has been essential, as any delay in obtaining Swedish agreement to act for us would have made it impossible for Glen Balfour Paul to complete the necessary arrangements with his Swedish opposite number in Baghdad before his own departure. We are extremely grateful to you all - but particularly to Patricia Hutchinson and Griffith who have been bothered at all hours of the day and night, not to mention at the weekend - for the way in which Swedish agreement has been successfully obtained on so many complicated issues.
3. I shall be asking the Swedish Ambassador here to call on me fairly soon to thank him for his Government's co-operation.

A D Parsons

[Reply at folio 165]

Copy to: WED
D I Lewty Esq Baghdad.

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/5/81

139

TOP COPY

PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 131930Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 213 OF 13 DECEMBER INFO PRIORITY
BAGHDAD.

126

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 384: SEVERANCE.

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2: WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO PARAGRAPHS 1B AND 5
OF BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1280. WE HOPE THAT THE SWEDES AGREE THAT
THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BETWEEN MR BALFOUR PAUL AND GERRING, REPORTED
IN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 1280 ARE ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY.

130

2. ON PARAGRAPH 4 OF BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 1280, WE SEE NO (NO)
PARTICULAR NEED OR URGENCY FOR AN ANGLO/SWEDISH MEMORANDUM, BUT
THE SWEDES MAY HAVE VIEWS ON THIS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
ARABIAN D
WED
P & CD
OIL D
POD
GRD
PSD
SECURITY D
ASD
COMMS D
CONSULAR D

CONFIDENTIAL

24

140

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 16 DEC 1971 NEQ 3/5481

EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 140830Z
UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1286 OF 14 DEC 71 INFO TO BEIRUT
AND KUWAIT.

PLEASE ADDRESS ALL BAGS TO US TO THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY,
BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, BAGHDAD.

2. PLEASE ALSO INFORM COI AND BBC OF THE NEW FORM OF
ADDRESS.

LEWTY

[COPIES SENT TO COI AND BBC]

FILES
COMMS D
DWS
NED
A & SD
POD

pk

ROYAL AFGHAN EMBASSY

No. 581

The Royal Afghan Embassy presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and has the honour to inform them that the Government of Afghanistan have accepted a request from the Government of Iraq to look after their interests and those of Iraqi Nationals in the United Kingdom through the facilities of the Royal Afghan Embassy in London.

The aforementioned arrangements will remain valid until further notice, or upon restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Iraq.

The Royal Afghan Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

14th December, 1971.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London.

*See reply**pub. 31/12*

W/41

Mr Star P.C.D

Iraq

1. I attach an N.V. from the Afghan Embassy about the protection of Iraq interests in the UK. I have retained another copy on NEA 3/548/1.

2. I should be grateful for advice from your Department about action on this Note. Presumably we should reply, and I attach a short draft. But is there anything else we should do?

Vernon Beckett

17/12

Vern Beckett, NE Department

I am afraid this Department is not in a position to advise on a line. I suggest that a recent president

(I say 1967?) will provide the
guidance you need.

Callinil
C.D. SMITH
P-C DEPT
17/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry

DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

G G Stockwell Esq
IPC

From
G B Chalmers
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

cc: British Interests Section
Swedish Embassy
BAGHDAD

Chancery
STOCKHOLM

IPC COMMUNICATIONS WITH BAGHDAD

1. As you know, since the severance of diplomatic relations between the Government of Iraq and HM Government, we have been trying to clarify the arrangements for your ^{Confidential} telegraphic traffic to and from Baghdad.

2. We have now agreed the following arrangements with the Swedish Government, which is protecting our interests in Iraq. Cypher communications between the British Interests Section in Baghdad and the FCO continue. The Swedish Government has agreed that the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad should not inspect or monitor ^{such} ~~our~~ communications ~~by bag or wireless~~ on the understanding that:

- Their content is commercial/economic, consular or cultural. Messages sent by your Company ^(covered by memorandum to his friends) on our channels are subject to the stipulations in ^{b) and} paragraph 4 below.
- They contain no political content other than:
 - what is inseparable from reports under the above approved headings;
 - unclassified material transmitted without comment.

Copy to
Weckert 15/12

Miss Beckett

Mr Evans

will this
do?

Mr Gervan: 15/12

Based on a draft

by Mr Tunnell:
do you agree.

Weckert

15/12

OK by me 16/12

3. The Swedish Ambassador or his representative is to receive verbally from the Second Secretary in charge of ^{for} ~~the~~ Interests Section a general idea of all activities and communications sent or received.

4. I think you will agree that these arrangements seem satisfactory, especially as the Swedes have specifically agreed that your traffic should be passed on our channels. Our understanding is that you should be able to communicate in the same manner as before the severance of relations, with the exception that, if you should wish to send messages with a sensitive political content, it will be necessary for you to arrange for a special courier or safe hand

approved by IPC.

5. I should be grateful for your confirmation that ~~you agree to~~ ^{you agree to} the above arrangements.

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
17 DEC 1971

TOP COPY

143

STOCKHOLM

151700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/548/1

TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO. 392 OF 15 DECEMBER INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 213 : SEVERANCE.

1. THE SWEDES ARE QUITE CONTENT WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BETWEEN MR BALFOUR-PAUL AND AMBASSADOR GERRING AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 1280. (139)

2. WHILE THE SWEDES SEE NO URGENCY FOR AN ANGLO-SWEDISH MEMORANDUM THEY DO THINK SOME DOCUMENT WILL BE REQUIRED AND ARE DRAFTING. (130)

MCGHIE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

W.E.D.

P. & C.D.

P.O.D.

CONSULAR DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

ML

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 160605Z
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 DEC 1971 NEZ 3/541.

Ente

144

TO IMMEDIATE ECO TELNO 1287 OF 16 DECEMBER INFO KUWAIT AND STOCKHOLM.

122^A
YOUR TELNO 1321; CLASSIFIED BAG SERVICE.

1. I HAVE TOLD THE BOAC MANAGER HERE THAT WITH EFFECT FROM THIS WEEKEND WE SHALL BE USING HIS FLIGHT FOR A CARE OF PILOT SERVICE.

2. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR HAS ASKED WHAT DOCUMENTATION WE PROPOSE TO GIVE TO THE PILOT. SWEDISH PRACTICE IS TO GIVE HIM A CASUAL COURIER'S PASSPORT. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT WE DO NOT NORMALLY NEED TO ISSUE SUCH THINGS BUT I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW IF YOU WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR MAKING OUT A SWEDISH CASUAL COURIER'S WAYBILL FOR THE PILOT WHO WILL CARRY OUR BAG, IF WE HAVE ONE, TO LONDON ON SUNDAY. THE AMBASSADOR IS NOT HAPPY AT THE THOUGHT OF A CLASSIFIED BAG GOING UN-DOCUMENTED.

3. WE DO NOT EXPECT TO HAVE A CLASSIFIED BAG TO PUT ON THE PLANE TO KUWAIT ON SATURDAY EVENING. I SUGGEST THAT WE ESTABLISH THE PRACTICE THAT KUWAIT NEED NOT EXPECT SUCH A BAG UNLESS WE WARN THEM BY TELEGRAM THAT WE SHALL BE SENDING ONE.

LEWTY
FILES
COMMS D

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

COPIES TO:
MR SYDENHAM-CLARKE, SECURITY DIV.
MISS BECKETT, NED

CONFIDENTIAL

m h

145

TOP COPY

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 160930Z

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 DEC 1971 NEQ 3/54/1

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1292 OF 16 DEC.

MY TELNO 1290 : S.O'S

D/G OF PROTOCOL TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT
WE COULD HAVE ANOTHER S.O. IF WE WISHED.

2. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IS AWARE OF OUR REQUEST,
BUT SINCE HE IS SICK TODAY I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE
TO TELL HIM OF THE IRAQI REPLY NOR GET HIS FINAL CONSENT.


LEWTY

FCO DISTRIBUTION

NED

NNNNN

h



CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 DEC 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
--

146 NE
V3

3/4

SUMMARY

VALEDICTORY DESPATCH FROM BAGHDAD

Enter

1. The despatch is intended to be a valedictory for the Embassy as well as the Ambassador (paragraph 1).
2. The background to the break in relations. Ructions of some kind were expected (paragraph 2).
3. The Iraqi Government's first reactions to Iranian landings on "the Islands" was not particularly menacing. The subsequent decision to break relations scarcely followed from it. The impression was of a decision not wholly premeditated (paragraphs 3-5).
4. Notification of the break: its circumstances and substance (paragraph 7).
5. Indications that the break is "soft" (paragraph 8).
6. Assumption of protection responsibilities by the Swedes (paragraph 9).
7. Impressions carried away, after 2½ years in Iraq, of the country, its people and its government (paragraph 10).
8. Disagreeable aspects of life under the Ba'ath (paragraph 11).
9. But the country and its problems retain a strange fascination. Those earmarked to stay in the Interests Section seem happy to do so, and there is a job to be done (paragraph 12).
10. Last thoughts (paragraph 13).

Regy: p/w minutes
arranging for print

12/11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION

BAGHDAD

3/4

11 December 1971

The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON

Sir

1. Diplomatic Service Instructions do not indicate whether a valedictory despatch is expected from someone leaving his post in the circumstances in which I am leaving mine tomorrow. Nor do the circumstances concerned conduce to an entirely objective assessment of the government by which I have just been (if that is the term) discredited. However a valedictory, of a rather hurried sort, is what this despatch will aim to be - not just of a departing ambassador but of a departing embassy.
2. The circumstances of the Embassy's departure should perhaps be summarized first. It had of course long been foreseen that the final stages of Britain's military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and in particular the resulting insistence by the Shah on acquiring control over the disputed islands near its mouth, would cause ructions in Iraq. The Iraqi authorities had been voicing their sensitivity over the islands for months - they are of course just as interested in the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Hormuz as are the Iranians - and had been seeking to whip up Arab opposition to Iran's undisguised designs, not least by the despatch in July and in November of two successive, if ineffective, waves of presidential emissaries in all directions. So that when the news broke on 30 November of

the simultaneous landings of Iranian troops, despite the differing circumstances, on Abu Musa and the Tumbs, I and my staff were certainly expecting trouble. What was not certain was the form the trouble would take: would it be limited to sound and fury or take physical shape?

3. First reactions were not particularly menacing. I was simply summoned on 30 November by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and handed, over an amiable cup of coffee, two Notes protesting - in intemperate terms but apparently just for the record - at Britain's failure to carry out her protective obligations towards the two Trucial States concerned under the 1892 Agreements (on the eve, of course, of their annulment). The tone of the interview may be judged by the Under Secretary's gay expression of gratitude for his presentation copy of Mr Donald Hawley's book on the Trucial States which had, he said, made the drafting of the Notes so much easier.

4. Consequently, the discovery at dawn next morning from my bedside transistor that diplomatic relations had been severed made my awakening, in the testing aftermath of St Andrews Night, doubly painful. The decision had, it transpired, been taken by the Revolutionary Command Council at 1.30 am as a riposte to Britain's "collusion" with the Iranian aggressor.

5. Since it seems improbable that any new facts (or fictions) had come to light during the interval between the first and second Iraqi reactions, their incompatibility is striking. It suggests that no premeditated plan of action had been drawn up by the ruling clique against a development of whose imminence they were certainly, in broad terms, aware.

Even by the Ba'ath's standards of government-by-caprice, this is curious. Maybe the régime had spent the interval waiting in vain for news of positive reactions on the part of their Arab brothers to the fate of the "three rocks" and only reached the decision to break relations in a mood of petulant frustration when none came.

6. Official confirmation that relations had been broken was not easily come by, since no-one in authority in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would answer the telephone all morning. Meanwhile my staff addressed themselves with characteristic cheerfulness to the familiar Baghdad pastime of burning files and battening hatches. At midday I dumped myself in the Protocol Office until someone responsible would see me. It was while I was still sitting there, receiving the commiserations of the young men who man it over the folly of their government, that a surrealist experience befell me. The one and only Ministry clock, which had hung motionless on the wall of the Protocol Office at three minutes past eleven since (it is said) 1958, lurched suddenly into life. Spell-bound we watched it hiccuping forward. After two minutes silence had been recorded by it, a messenger entered summoning me to the Chief of Protocol to receive sentence of expulsion. At that moment the clock stopped, as inexplicably as it had started. It has not stirred since.

7. I was handed by the Chief of Protocol a Note recording the RCC's decision to sever relations with Iran and ourselves. Since it contained offensive references to collusion, I refused it. In view of warnings of hostile demonstrations I

CONFIDENTIAL

requested and received assurances (valid as it turned out) that there would be no physical unpleasantness. I was told that I must leave in 10 days and the rest of my staff in 14, save that (unlike 1967 when the break was total) a small Interests Section headed by a second secretary would be permitted on a reciprocal basis and that Commercial and Cultural staff should be left unaffected. By negotiation over the next few days a fourth junior diplomat and two non-diplomats were added to the approved strength: and at the time of writing there is some chance of an Assistant Military Attaché being agreed as well, since the point has been taken by the Chief of Protocol that, if the Iraqi Ministry of Defence wants our military training programme to continue (and by an agreeable irony it includes the approaching admission of the Minister's son to Sandhurst), there must be a military member in our Interests Section to process it.

8. The impression that this is a "soft break" has been strengthened by rumours and indications of sundry kinds. Certainly at official level criticism of the break is widespread - most noticeably in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new Pakistani Ambassador was told by the Director General of Political Affairs that the whole Ministry regard the RCC's decision as childish impetuosity characteristic of "that body of reinforced concrete and clay" (which, he said, was the way his fellow officials refer to their government). And my Head of Chancery's servant, queuing in his grocery, overheard the man in front of him assuring the grocer that the British would be back by the end of the month. Subsequent enquiry from the grocer revealed that the client concerned was none other than

the Foreign Under Secretary (who certainly shops there and who had already, as it happens, sent me privately a friendly message).

9. ~~By~~ ^{On} 6 December it was formally announced that the Royal Swedish Government had agreed to assume protection of our interests, as they did in 1967. The Swedish Ambassador and his wife have shown us every courtesy, but discussion of arrangements for the execution of his protection role have not been helped by his own Ministry's reluctance (despite the valiant efforts of our Embassy in Stockholm) to give him clear-cut instructions on the vital issue, namely the extent to which he should monitor our communications by DWS and Bag. And he himself, though he has submitted recommendations of the most liberal kind, is too good a Swede to bend any rule without authority. The chances of getting this sorted out in the few hours before my departure are modest.

10. What impressions shall I carry away with me after nearly 2½ years in this hot, flat but potentially prosperous country with its volatile and fractious people? Certainly one must be a born plainsman to find the wastes of Sumeria, dotted with grey and colourless villages, stimulating - though its winding rivers and its light effects, changing as the days and seasons turn and the dates ripen, have a certain tranquil charm. But tranquillity is scarcely Iraq's key note. For despite the genial courtesy, superficial or not, of that part of the populace (and it remains the vast majority) which has not yet been barbarized by misgovernment, and despite the cultivated charm of many of the better educated, the Iraqis do not laugh as readily as other Arab peoples I have lived with and there is always a detectable sense of suppressed rage

or resentment in the Iraqi atmosphere. Most of this, despite the rent-a-crowd demonstrations of loyalty, is directed privately towards the government - though not, I suspect, towards this particular government more than any other they have had. For almost by definition all governments in Iraq are bad; and certainly by definition they govern by intimidation. They have to - and to this extent the Iraqis get the government they deserve. The present Ba'athist model (as I have represented, no doubt ad nauseam, to your Department and as I still believe, despite the circumstances of this despatch) is not, though nasty enough, as nasty as it is sometimes painted. And there is something to be said for keeping hold of it for fear of finding something worse.

11. There are certainly two features of life in Iraq which should compel one to leave it without regret. Firstly it has become under this government (if it was not already) a Police State; the security narks are everywhere; official suspicions of the West (however factitious) being what they are, all but the bravest or the officially immune are out of one's social reach; one lives in something like a diplomatic ghetto. Secondly (if so coloured a phrase is permissible) truth is officially dishonoured. I do not of course claim that truth is universally honoured in the West. But the total disregard for it in Iraq's controlled publicity media, the suppression of free argument, the spiritual ^up~~am~~perization of the people, and the fact that the makers of this policy are virtually out of reach of argument, should make Iraq a pretty drab place for the practice of diplomacy.

CONFIDENTIAL

12. And yet by some inexplicable perversity this fractious, terrorized, ill-administered republic still continues to exercise a strange fascination. The West has been notoriously slow to appreciate that the adolescence of a people, in the aftermath of paternalism, is just as psychologically painful as any other adolescence. The blandishments of Moscow make it doubly difficult for a people going through this process in the present generation to emerge calling their souls their own. Since they resent help if paternalist motives are suspected, patience and understanding may pay off better than parental fussing. For representatives of the West it is a frustrating business. But Iraq in the '70's is still an intriguing experience. Those of my staff who remain behind seem glad to stay; most of those who are leaving are sad to go. And there is certainly a job to be done by those who stay, as there will be by a full mission when relations are restored. In the commercial field, for example, we already face a decline in our share of the market and there are plenty of obstacles to reversing the trend; but the market is expanding dramatically as oil wealth soars, and at least we shall have three full-time commercial officers left to continue the struggle.

13. One often asks oneself what this country would be like if the Ba'athists were overthrown. (It is not after all inevitable that their successors would be even more illiberal.) There seems at present little likelihood of a successful coup being mounted from any direction. But such is the Ba'athist clique's increasing hubris that we can perhaps leave it to Nemesis

CONFIDENTIAL

to mount one in her own good time. Certainly, as I and most of my staff fly out of Baghdad tomorrow and look down over this unhappy city, we shall be wishing Nemesis luck.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Khartoum. Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, Tehran, Bahrain (2), Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Washington, Stockholm and UK Mission New York.

I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your obedient servant

H.G. Baepher

PS At a final session today with the Swedish Ambassador on outstanding points a loose but reasonable modus vivendi was worked out on the vital issue mentioned in paragraph 9 above. Neither he nor the Swedish Head of the Interests Section will require to inspect or monitor communications by bag or wireless on the understanding that they contain no political content other than (a) what is inseparable from reports under other approved headings and (b) unclassified material transmitted without comment. He or his representative is to receive verbally from the second secretary in the Interests Section a general idea of all activities and all communications sent or received.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 3 FEB 1972

N (146)
Secretary of State.

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

Mr Balfour Paul has
seen these minutes.

I attach a copy of ..Baghdad... despatch No ^{para 3} 1/2
of ...11...~~December~~....., received in Department ...17. ~~December~~

I have/have not sent this despatch for printing
~~FCO/FCO-WH/Volume only~~, with A/C Commonwealth distribution.

J. M. Egerton

Assistant

I recommend

do not recommend

that it be given priority printing

I propose

do not propose

to submit the minuted copy

unless otherwise instructed.

This is an excellent despatch. Like all
Mr. Balfour Paul's finished work, it is
beautifully written. We sent a copy for
printing on 3 January. R. M. Evans

Head of Department

Mr. Parsons

Mr. Le Quesne

Sir Denis Greenhill

Private Secy.

The Secy of State would enjoy this

12 January, 1972.

My chief regret about the
Islands movement is that
it should have
resulted, so positively,
in the departure of
Mr. Balfour Paul.
He is a very old
friend & for whom
I have the greatest
admiration.

14/1.
D. Greenhill

D. Evans
13/1

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr Parsons
NED

Secretary of State

It is extraordinary how many lunatics we have to deal with. It 'soft-break' is a rather comfortable thought.

3/4

SUMMARY

VALEDICTORY DESPATCH FROM BAGHDAD

1. The despatch is intended to be a valedictory for the Embassy as well as the Ambassador (paragraph 1).
2. The background to the break in relations. Ructions of some kind were expected (paragraph 2).
3. The Iraqi Government's first reactions to Iranian landings on "the Islands" was not particularly menacing. The subsequent decision to break relations scarcely followed from it. The impression was of a decision not wholly premeditated (paragraphs 3-5).
4. Notification of the break: its circumstances and substance (paragraph 7).
5. Indications that the break is "soft" (paragraph 8).
6. Assumption of protection responsibilities by the Swedes (paragraph 9).
7. Impressions carried away, after 2½ years in Iraq of the country, its people and its government (paragraph 10).
8. Disagreeable aspects of life under the Ba'ath (paragraph 11).
9. But the country and its problems retain a strange fascination. Those earmarked to stay in the Interests Section seem happy to do so, and there is a job to be done (paragraph 12).
10. Last thoughts (paragraph 13).

25/1

Quite admirable in both content & style

Mr G-D has obviously

thoroughly digested

House's conduct

Admirable & acquiescent

rebut in and out

Serrano mentions

2/11

Mr Balfour-Paul is in the Office, chairing a committee on Antarctic Seals (!): I should like him to see these minutes.

Nurs Beckett

AS 26

Mr LeQuenne may like to see first. Back to me. Wicket NED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION

BAGHDAD

3/4

11 December 1971

The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON

Sir

1. Diplomatic Service Instructions do not indicate whether a valedictory despatch is expected from someone leaving his post in the circumstances in which I am leaving mine tomorrow. Nor do the circumstances concerned conduce to an entirely objective assessment of the government by which I have just been (if that is the term) discredited. However a valedictory, of a rather hurried sort, is what this despatch will aim to be - not just of a departing ambassador but of a departing embassy.

2. The circumstances of the Embassy's departure should perhaps be summarized first. It had of course long been foreseen that the final stages of Britain's military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and in particular the resulting insistence by the Shah on acquiring control over the disputed islands near its mouth, would cause ructions in Iraq. The Iraqi authorities had been voicing their sensitivity over the islands for months - they are of course just as interested in the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Hormuz as are the Iranians - and had been seeking to whip up Arab opposition to Iran's undisguised designs, not least by the despatch in July and in November of two successive, if ineffective, waves of presidential emissaries in all directions. So that when the news broke on 30 November of

CONFIDENTIAL

the simultaneous landings of Iranian troops, despite the differing circumstances, on Abu Musa and the Tumbs, I and my staff were certainly expecting trouble. What was not certain was the form the trouble would take: would it be limited to sound and fury or take physical shape?

3. First reactions were not particularly menacing. I was simply summoned on 30 November by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and handed, over an amiable cup of coffee, two Notes protesting - in intemperate terms but apparently just for the record - at Britain's failure to carry out her protective obligations towards the two Trucial States concerned under the 1892 Agreements (on the eve, of course, of their annulment). The tone of the interview may be judged by the Under Secretary's gay expression of gratitude for his presentation copy of Mr Donald Hawley's book on the Trucial States which had, he said, made the drafting of the Notes so much easier.

4. Consequently, the discovery at dawn next morning from my bedside transistor that diplomatic relations had been severed made my awakening, in the testing aftermath of St Andrews Night, doubly painful. The decision had, it transpired, been taken by the Revolutionary Command Council at 1.30 am as a riposte to Britain's "collusion" with the Iranian aggressor.

5. Since it seems improbable that any new facts (or fictions) had come to light during the interval between the first and second Iraqi reactions, their incompatibility is striking. It suggests that no premeditated plan of action had been drawn up by the ruling clique against a development of whose imminence they were certainly, in broad terms, aware.

Even by the Ba'ath's standards of government-by-caprice, this is curious. Maybe the régime had spent the interval waiting in vain for news of positive reactions on the part of their Arab brothers to the fate of the "three rocks" and only reached the decision to break relations in a mood of petulant frustration when none came.

6. Official confirmation that relations had been broken was not easily come by, since no-one in authority in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would answer the telephone all morning. Meanwhile my staff addressed themselves with characteristic cheerfulness to the familiar Baghdad passtime of burning files and battening hatches. At midday I dumped myself in the Protocol Office until someone responsible would see me. It was while I was still sitting there, receiving the commiserations of the young men who man it over the folly of their government, that a surrealist experience befell me. The one and only Ministry clock, which had hung motionless on the wall of the Protocol Office at three minutes past eleven since (it is said) 1958, lurched suddenly into life. Spell-bound we watched it hiccuping forward. After two minutes silence had been recorded by it, a messenger entered summoning me to the Chief of Protocol to receive sentence of expulsion. At that moment the clock stopped, as inexplicably as it had started. It has not stirred since.

7. I was handed by the Chief of Protocol a Note recording the RCC's decision to sever relations with Iran and ourselves. Since it contained offensive references to collusion, I refused it. In view of warnings of hostile demonstrations I

requested and received assurances (valid as it turned out) that there would be no physical unpleasantness. I was told that I must leave in 10 days and the rest of my staff in 14, save that (unlike 1967 when the break was total) a small Interests Section headed by a second secretary would be permitted on a reciprocal basis and that Commercial and Cultural staff should be left unaffected. By negotiation over the next few days a fourth junior diplomat and two non-diplomats were added to the approved strength: and at the time of writing there is some chance of an Assistant Military Attaché being agreed as well, since the point has been taken by the Chief of Protocol that, if the Iraqi Ministry of Defence wants our military training programme to continue (and by an agreeable irony it includes the approaching admission of the Minister's son to Sandhurst), there must be a military member in our Interests Section to process it.

8. The impression that this is a "soft break" has been strengthened by rumours and indications of sundry kinds. Certainly at official level criticism of the break is widespread - most noticeably in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new Pakistani Ambassador was told by the Director General of Political Affairs that the whole Ministry regard the RCC's decision as childish impetuosity characteristic of "that body of reinforced concrete and clay" (which, he said, was the way his fellow officials refer to their government). And my Head of Chancery's servant, queuing in his grocery, overheard the man in front of him assuring the grocer that the British would be back by the end of the month. Subsequent enquiry from the grocer revealed that the client concerned was none other than

the Foreign Under Secretary (who certainly shops there and who had already, as it happens, sent me privately a friendly message).

9. By 6 December it was formally announced that the Royal Swedish Government had agreed to assume protection of our interests, as they did in 1967. The Swedish Ambassador and his wife have shown us every courtesy, but discussion of arrangements for the execution of his protection role have not been helped by his own Ministry's reluctance (despite the valiant efforts of our Embassy in Stockholm) to give him clear-cut instructions on the vital issue, namely the extent to which he should monitor our communications by DWS and Bag. And he himself, though he has submitted recommendations of the most liberal kind, is too good a Swede to bend any rule without authority. The chances of getting this sorted out in the few hours before my departure are modest.

10. What impressions shall I carry away with me after nearly 2½ years in this hot, flat but potentially prosperous country with its volatile and fractious people? Certainly one must be a born plainsman to find the wastes of Sumeria, dotted with grey and colourless villages, stimulating - though its winding rivers and its light effects, changing as the days and seasons turn and the dates ripen, have a certain tranquil charm. But tranquillity is scarcely Iraq's key note. For despite the genial courtesy, superficial or not, of that part of the populace (and it remains the vast majority) which has not yet been barbarized by misgovernment, and despite the cultivated charm of many of the better educated, the Iraqis do not laugh as readily as other Arab peoples I have lived with and there is always a detectable sense of suppressed rage

or resentment in the Iraqi atmosphere. Most of this, despite the rent-a-crowd demonstrations of loyalty, is directed privately towards the government - though not, I suspect, towards this particular government more than any other they have had. For almost by definition all governments in Iraq are bad; and certainly by definition they govern by intimidation. They have to - and to this extent the Iraqis get the government they deserve. The present Ba'athist model (as I have represented, no doubt ad nauseam, to your Department and as I still believe, despite the circumstances of this despatch) is not, though nasty enough, as nasty as it is sometimes painted. And there is something to be said for keeping hold of it for fear of finding something worse.

11. There are certainly two features of life in Iraq which should compel one to leave it without regret. Firstly it has become under this government (if it was not already) a Police State; the security narks are everywhere; official suspicions of the West (however factitious) being what they are, all but the bravest or the officially immune are out of one's social reach; one lives in something like a diplomatic ghetto. Secondly (if so coloured a phrase is permissible) truth is officially dishonoured. I do not of course claim that truth is universally honoured in the West. But the total disregard for it in Iraq's controlled publicity media, the suppression of free argument, the spiritual ^upauperization of the people, and the fact that the makers of this policy are virtually out of reach of argument, should make Iraq a pretty drab place for the practice of diplomacy.

12. And yet by some inexplicable perversity this fractious, terrorized, ill-administered republic still continues to exercise a strange fascination. The West has been notoriously slow to appreciate that the adolescence of a people, in the aftermath of paternalism, is just as psychologically painful as any other adolescence. The blandishments of Moscow make it doubly difficult for a people going through this process in the present generation to emerge calling their souls their own. Since they resent help if paternalist motives are suspected, patience and understanding may pay off better than parental fussing. For representatives of the West it is a frustrating business. But Iraq in the '70's is still an intriguing experience. Those of my staff who remain behind seem glad to stay; most of those who are leaving are sad to go. And there is certainly a job to be done by those who stay, as there will be by a full mission when relations are restored. In the commercial field, for example, we already face a decline in our share of the market and there are plenty of obstacles to reversing the trend; but the market is expanding dramatically as oil wealth soars, and at least we shall have three full-time commercial officers left to continue the struggle.

13. One often asks oneself what this country would be like if the Ba'athists were overthrown. (It is not after all inevitable that their successors would be even more illiberal.) There seems at present little likelihood of a successful coup being mounted from any direction. But such is the Ba'athist clique's increasing hubris that we can perhaps leave it to Nemesis

CONFIDENTIAL

to mount one in her own good time. Certainly, as I and most of my staff fly out of Baghdad tomorrow and look down over this unhappy city, we shall be wishing Nemesis luck.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Khartoum. Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, Tehran, Bahrain (2), Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Washington, Stockholm and UK Mission New York.

I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your obedient servant

H G BALFOUR PAUL

PS At a final session today with the Swedish Ambassador on outstanding points a loose but reasonable modus vivendi was worked out on the vital issue mentioned in paragraph 9 above. Neither he nor the Swedish Head of the Interests Section will require to inspect or monitor communications by bag or wireless on the understanding that they contain no political content other than (a) what is inseparable from reports under other approved headings and (b) unclassified material transmitted without comment. He or his representative is to receive verbally from the second secretary in the Interests Section a general idea of all activities and all communications sent or received.

W 146

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 1/72

NEQ 3/548/1

General Distribution

IRAQ

11 December, 1971

VALEDICTORY DESPATCH FROM BAGHDAD

*Her Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*

SUMMARY

The despatch is intended to be a valedictory for the Embassy as well as the Ambassador. (Paragraph 1.)

2. The background to the break in relations. Ructions of some kind were expected. (Paragraph 2.)

3. The Iraqi Government's first reactions to Iranian landings on "the Islands" was not particularly menacing. The subsequent decision to break relations scarcely followed from it. The impression was of a decision not wholly premeditated. (Paragraphs 3-5.)

4. Notification of the break: its circumstances and substance. (Paragraph 7.)

5. Indications that the break is "soft". (Paragraph 8.)

6. Assumption of protection responsibilities by the Swedes. (Paragraph 9.)

7. Impressions carried away, after 2½ years in Iraq, of the country, its people and its Government. (Paragraph 10.)

8. Disagreeable aspects of life under the Ba'ath. (Paragraph 11.)

9. But the country and its problems retain a strange fascination. Those earmarked to stay in the Interests Section seem happy to do so, and there is a job to be done. (Paragraph 12.)

10. Last thoughts. (Paragraph 13.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Baghdad,

11 December, 1971.

Diplomatic Service Instructions do not indicate whether a valedictory despatch is expected from someone leaving his post in the circumstances in which I am leaving mine tomorrow. Nor do the circumstances concerned conduce to an entirely objective assessment of the Government by which I have just been (if that is the term) discredited. However a valedictory, of a rather hurried sort, is what this despatch will aim to be—not just of a departing Ambassador but of a departing Embassy.

2. The circumstances of the Embassy's departure should perhaps be summarised first. It had of course long been foreseen that the final stages of Britain's military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and in particular the resulting insistence by the Shah on acquiring control over the disputed islands near its mouth, would cause ructions in Iraq. The

CONFIDENTIAL

Iraqi authorities had been voicing their sensitivity over the islands for months—they are of course just as interested in the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Hormuz as are the Iranians—and had been seeking to whip up Arab opposition to Iran's undisguised designs, not least by the despatch in July and in November of two successive, if ineffective, waves of presidential emissaries in all directions. So that when the news broke on 30 November of the simultaneous landings of Iranian troops, despite the differing circumstances, on Abu Musa and the Tumbs, I and my staff were certainly expecting trouble. What was not certain was the form the trouble would take: would it be limited to sound and fury or take physical shape?

3. First reactions were not particularly menacing. I was simply summoned on 30 November by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and handed, over an amiable cup of coffee, two Notes protesting—in intemperate terms but apparently just for the record—at Britain's failure to carry out her protective obligations towards the two Trucial States concerned under the 1892 Agreements (on the eve, of course, of their annulment). The tone of the interview may be judged by the Under-Secretary's gay expression of gratitude for his presentation copy of Mr. Donald Hawley's book on the Trucial States which had, he said, made the drafting of the Notes so much easier.

4. Consequently, the discovery at dawn next morning from my bedside transistor that diplomatic relations had been severed made my awakening, in the testing aftermath of St. Andrew's Night, doubly painful. The decision had, it transpired, been taken by the Revolutionary Command Council at 1.30 a.m. as a riposte to Britain's "collusion" with the Iranian aggressor.

5. Since it seems improbable that any new facts (or fictions) had come to light during the interval between the first and second Iraqi reactions, their incompatibility is striking. It suggests that no premeditated plan of action had been drawn up by the ruling clique against a development of whose imminence they were certainly, in broad terms, aware. Even by the Ba'ath's standards of government-by-caprice, this is curious. Maybe the régime had spent the interval waiting in vain for news of positive reactions on the part of their Arab brothers to the fate of the "three rocks" and only reached the decision to break relations in a mood of petulant frustration when none came.

6. Official confirmation that relations had been broken was not easily come by, since no-one in authority in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would answer the telephone all morning. Meanwhile my staff addressed themselves with characteristic cheerfulness to the familiar Baghdad pastime of burning files and battening hatches. At midday I dumped myself in the Protocol Office until someone responsible would see me. It was while I was still sitting there, receiving the commiserations of the young men who man it over the folly of their Government, that a surrealist experience befell me. The one and only Ministry clock, which had hung motionless on the wall of the Protocol Office at three minutes past eleven since (it is said) 1958, lurched suddenly into life. Spellbound we watched it hiccuping forward. After two minutes silence had been recorded by it, a messenger entered summoning me to the Chief of Protocol to receive sentence of expulsion. At that moment the clock stopped, as inexplicably as it had started. It has not stirred since.

7. I was handed by the Chief of Protocol a Note recording the RCC's decision to sever relations with Iran and ourselves. Since it contained offensive references to collusion, I refused it. In view of warnings of hostile demonstrations I requested and received assurances (valid as it turned out) that there would be no physical unpleasantness. I was told that I must leave in 10 days and the

rest of my staff in 14, save that (unlike 1967 when the break was total) a small Interests Section headed by a second secretary would be permitted on a reciprocal basis and that Commercial and Cultural staff should be left unaffected. By negotiation over the next few days a fourth junior diplomat and two non-diplomats were added to the approved strength: and at the time of writing there is some chance of an Assistant Military Attaché being agreed as well, since the point has been taken by the Chief of Protocol that, if the Iraqi Ministry of Defence wants our military training programme to continue (and by an agreeable irony it includes the approaching admission of the Minister's son to Sandhurst), there must be a military member in our Interests Section to process it.

8. The impression that this is a "soft break" has been strengthened by rumours and indications of sundry kinds. Certainly at official level criticism of the break is wide-spread—most noticeably in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new Pakistani Ambassador was told by the Director-General of Political Affairs that the whole Ministry regard the RCC's decision as childish impetuosity characteristic of "that body of reinforced concrete and clay" (which, he said, was the way his fellow officials refer to their Government). And my Head of Chancery's servant, queuing in his grocery, overheard the man in front of him assuring the grocer that the British would be back by the end of the month. Subsequent enquiry from the grocer revealed that the client concerned was none other than the Foreign Under Secretary (who certainly shops there and who had already, as it happens, sent me privately a friendly message).

9. By 6 December it was formally announced that the Royal Swedish Government had agreed to assume protection of our interests, as they did in 1967. The Swedish Ambassador and his wife have shown us every courtesy, but discussion of arrangements for the execution of his protection role have not been helped by his own Ministry's reluctance (despite the valiant efforts of our Embassy in Stockholm) to give him clear-cut instructions on the vital issue, namely the extent to which he should monitor our communications by DWS and Bag. And he himself, though he has submitted recommendations of the most liberal kind, is too good a Swede to bend any rule without authority. The chances of getting this sorted out in the few hours before my departure are modest.

10. What impressions shall I carry away with me after nearly 2½ years in this hot, flat but potentially prosperous country with its volatile and fractious people? Certainly one must be a born plainsman to find the wastes of Sumeria, dotted with grey and colourless villages, stimulating—though its winding rivers and its light effects, changing as the days and seasons turn and the dates ripen, have a certain tranquil charm. But tranquility is scarcely Iraq's key note. For despite the genial courtesy, superficial or not, of that part of the populace (and it remains the vast majority) which has not yet been barbarised by misgovernment, and despite the cultivated charm of many of the better educated, the Iraqis do not laugh as readily as other Arab peoples I have lived with and there is always a detectable sense of suppressed rage or resentment in the Iraqi atmosphere. Most of this, despite the rent-a-crowd demonstrations of loyalty, is directed privately towards the Government—though not, I suspect, towards this particular Government more than any other they have had. For almost by definition all Governments in Iraq are bad; and certainly by definition they govern by intimidation. They have to—and to this extent the Iraqis get the Government they deserve. The present Ba'athist model (as I have represented, no doubt *ad nauseam*, to your Department and as I still believe, despite the circumstances of this despatch) is not, though nasty enough, as nasty as it is sometimes painted. And there is something to be said for keeping hold of it for fear of finding something worse.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. There are certainly two features of life in Iraq which should compel one to leave it without regret. Firstly it has become under this Government (if it was not already) a Police State; the security narks are everywhere; official suspicions of the West (however factitious) being what they are, all but the bravest or the officially immune are out of one's social reach; one lives in something like a diplomatic ghetto. Secondly (if so coloured a phrase is permissible) truth is officially dishonoured. I do not of course claim that truth is universally honoured in the West. But the total disregard for it in Iraq's controlled publicity media, the suppression of free argument, the spiritual pauperisation of the people, and the fact that the makers of this policy are virtually out of reach of argument, should make Iraq a pretty drab place for the practice of diplomacy.

12. And yet by some inexplicable perversity this fractious, terrorised, ill-administered Republic still continues to exercise a strange fascination. The West has been notoriously slow to appreciate that the adolescence of a people, in the aftermath of paternalism, is just as psychologically painful as any other adolescence. The blandishments of Moscow make it doubly difficult for a people going through this process in the present generation to emerge calling their souls their own. Since they resent help if paternalist motives are suspected, patience and understanding may pay off better than parental fussing. For representatives of the West it is a frustrating business. But Iraq in the '70s is still an intriguing experience. Those of my staff who remain behind seem glad to stay; most of those who are leaving are sad to go. And there is certainly a job to be done by those who stay, as there will be by a full mission when relations are restored. In the commercial field, for example, we already face a decline in our share of the market and there are plenty of obstacles to reversing the trend; but the market is expanding dramatically as oil wealth soars, and at least we shall have three full-time commercial officers left to continue the struggle.

13. One often asks oneself what this country would be like if the Ba'athists were overthrown. (It is not after all inevitable that their successors would be even more illiberal.) There seems at present little likelihood of a successful *coup* being mounted from any direction. But such is the Ba'athist clique's increasing *hubris* that we can perhaps leave it to Nemesis to mount one in her own good time. Certainly, as I and most of my staff fly out of Baghdad tomorrow and look down over this unhappy city, we shall be wishing Nemesis luck.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, Tehran, Bahrain (2), Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Washington, Stockholm and the United Kingdom Mission, New York.

I have, etc.,

H. G. BALFOUR PAUL.

P.S. At a final session today with the Swedish Ambassador on outstanding points a loose but reasonable *modus vivendi* was worked out on the vital issue mentioned in paragraph 9 above. Neither he nor the Swedish Head of the Interests Section will require to inspect or monitor communications by bag or wireless on the understanding that they contain no political content other than (a) what is inseparable from reports under other approved headings and (b) unclassified material transmitted without comment. He or his representative is to receive verbally from the Second Secretary in the Interests Section a general idea of all activities and all communications sent or received.

CONFIDENTIAL


Encl

147

ML

16 December 1971

G G Stockwell Esq
Iraq Petroleum Company Limited
33 Cavendish Square
London W 1



IPC COMMUNICATIONS WITH BAGHDAD

1. As you know, since the severance of diplomatic relations between the Government of Iraq and HM Government, we have been trying to clarify the arrangements for your confidential telegraphic traffic to and from Baghdad.

2. We have now agreed the following arrangements with the Swedish Government, which is protecting our interests in Iraq. Cypher communications between the British Intelligence Section in Baghdad and the FCO continue. The Swedish Government has agreed that the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad should not inspect or monitor such communications on the understanding that:-

a. their content is commercial/economic, consular or cultural. Messages sent by your company on our channels are covered by this formula, subject to the stipulations in b. and paragraph 4 below.

b. They contain no political content other than:-

i. what is inseparable from reports under the above approved headings;

ii. unclassified material transmitted without comment.

3. The Swedish Ambassador or his representative is to receive verbally from the Second Secretary in charge of our Interests Section a general idea of all activities and communications sent or received.

4. I think you will agree that these arrangements seem satisfactory, especially as the Swedes have specifically agreed that your traffic should be passed on our channels. Our understanding is that you should be able to communicate in the same manner as before the severance of relations, with the

/exception

CONFIDENTIAL

pub 10/12

exception that, if you should wish to send messages with a sensitive political content, it will be necessary for you to arrange for a special courier or safe hand approved by IPC.

5. I should be grateful for your confirmation that you agree to the above arrangements.

G B Chalmers
Oil Department

Copied to:

British Interests Section, Swedish Embassy, Baghdad;
Chancery, Stockholm;
Miss Beckett, Near Eastern Department

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
20 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1



EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 180600Z
UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1293 OF 18 DEC 71 INFO TO STOCKHOLM.

MY TELS NOS 1290⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ AND 1292⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ : S.O.'S.

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR HAS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION
TO OUR HAVING ANOTHER S.O.

LEWTY

FCO DISTRIBUTION
NED

Mr MacRae has spoken
to PO's who are sending
out another 80.

pr 1
21/12

CONFIDENTIAL



With the compliments of
OIL DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

S.W.1

17 DEC 1950

RESTRICTED



BRITISH EMBASSY


STOCKHOLM

14 December 1971

3/18

150

Miss Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO



Enter

Dear Veronica,

SWEDISH PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ

130

1. Paragraph 4 of Baghdad telegram No 1280 relayed the view of the Swedish Ambassador that there was no need for an Anglo/Swedish memorandum unless both Governments insisted. I have had a word with Herr Persson, Head of the Foreign Interests Section in the MFA, informing him of the view of the Swedish Ambassador. He said that he was giving the matter a little thought but given the very different circumstances as compared with 1967 (he now seems to have acquired a better grip on the subject!) he was not sure what, if anything, would be required. He would get in touch with us during the next few days.
2. Perhaps at your leisure you could let us have your views. Presumably all we shall be liable for is the rather small extra expenses the Swedes will incur because of their protection of our interests.
3. I am going on leave to the UK for two weeks 19 December-2 January. During my absence Owen Griffith (1st Secretary Commercial) will look after any work re the Swedish protection of our interests in Iraq.

Yours ever

Peter Hutchinson

Miss P M Hutchinson

BU 10/1

RESTRICTED

151

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 DEC 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
--

EN CLAIR

FM F C O 161310Z

UNCLASSIFIED.

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1334 OF 16 DECEMBER.

FROM COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

PLEASE SAY WHETHER TELEGRAMS FOR BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION

SENT THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO PRODROME.

IF NOT PLEASE LET US KNOW TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS OF SWEDISH EMBASSY.

DOUGLAS HOME

FILES
COMMS DEPT:
DWS

COPIES TO:-
NED (MISS BECKETT)

mb

Harrod

RESTRICTED

Mr Rose

Miss Becken.

IRAQI MILITARY TRAINING

Pe. speak. R.E.

1. Iraq have a place at the current RAF staff course and one on the Army staff course starting in January 1972. They also have 4 places at Sandhurst and 5 at Mons spread over 1971-73. A number of miscellaneous Army officer courses are also arranged. Fifteen Air Force officers should also be under training during 1972 on various courses. In addition the Iraqis have asked for a quantity of flying training but we are not sure how serious they are about this.
2. Iraq was allocated £4,000 from UKMTAS funds for 1971/72. Our Embassy asked us to confine the use of this fund to paying for language training courses, which we have accepted.
3. With the concurrence of NED we have told Baghdad that we agree to continue with vacancies already allocated on courses.

25/12

T E F Pooley

T E F POOLEY
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
16 December 1971

I am.
R.E.
25/12

If NED are satisfied that the break in relations will not be prolonged - or are content to retain a military connection even without diplomatic relations for the sake of such influence as this helps us to retain - I think the Ministry of Defence would probably be content; though I presume they are being consulted. If not, there is considerable pressure on many of our courses in this country and we should not lightly continue to help the Iraqis if we have given them up for lost.

R M Tesh

R M TESH
17 December 1971

cc: Mr Evans (NED)
Mr Pooley

Col Giffith is drafting
on this
part 25/12

RESTRICTED

152

RECEIVED INS REGISTRY No. 10 21 DEC 1971 NEQ 8/548/1

EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 200600Z
UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1297 OF 20 DEC INFOR TO STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELNO 1334 (NOT TO STOCKHOLM) : TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS.

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR HAS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAS NOT OBJECTION
TO OUR CONTINUING TO HAVE COMMERCIAL CHANNEL TELEGRAMS
ADDRESSED TO PRODROME.

LEWTY

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

F I L E S
COMMS D
D W S

COPIES TO:
MISS BECKETT N E D

NNNNN

pub

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 200730Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
21 DEC 1971
NEQ J(548/)

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1298 OF 20 DEC.

CONFIDENTIAL BAGS SERVICE.

1. BOAC FLIGHT BA202/18 DECEMBER OVERFLEW FRANKFURT AND LANDED AT BAGHDAD 95 MINUTES AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. BOAC MEANT (BUT FORGOT) TO INFORM US.
2. MEETING AND ESCORT OFFICERS ARRIVED 35 MINUTES BEFORE ETA AND WERE TOLD ON THE AIRCRAFT THAT THE CHIEF STEWARD HAD HANDED A BAG TO IRAQ AIRWAYS FREIGHT CLERK AND RECEIVED A SIGNATURE. (SINCE THE STEWARD GAVE NO APPEARANCE OF HAVING BEEN BRIEFED WE SAID NOTHING TO HIM)
3. THE BAG WAS FOUND LYING IN THE FREIGHT SECTION WHERE IT HAD BEEN LEFT UNGUARDED FOR ABOUT 10 - 15 MINUTES.
4. ARCHIVIST (WHO WAS NOT ASKED FOR ANY FORM OF IDENTIFICATION) SIGNED A RECEIPT FOR ONE BAG FOR THE SWEDISH EMBASSY AND TOOK DELIVERY FROM THE FREIGHT CLERK.
5. THE BAG WAS OPENED WITHOUT TOUCHING THE SEAL AND, WITH THE ENVELOPES IT CONTAINED, WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU BY OUR NEXT CONFIDENTIAL SERVICE.
6. THE SWEDES SUPERVISED THE CLOSING OF OUR AF BAGS THIS WEEK. TO SATISFY BOTH PARTIES, THE ARCHIVIST FIRST MADE UP THE BAGS IN THE TIME HONOURED FO MANNER AND THEN OVER BAGGED THEM TO SWEDISH REQUIREMENTS, VIZ AN UNMARKED BAG AND A BLANK LEAD SEAL. (PLEASE SEND US A PAIR OF PLAIN BAG CLAMPS BY THE NEXT BAG.) IF YOU THINK IT EITHER APPROPRIATE OR NECESSARY WILL YOU PLEASE FOLLOW OUR PATTERN SINCE WE CANNOT OTHERWISE DETECT INTERFERENCE, IT MAY BE THAT WE ARE MAKING HEAVY WEATHER OF THIS EXERCISE, BUT IT SEEMS WISER TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

/7. WE

CONFIDENTIAL

7. WE WERE PLEASED TO RECEIVE NON-CONFIDENTIAL BAGS
BY THE SAME FLIGHT WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO COLLECT IMMEDIATELY
SINCE IT TOOK US THREE DAYS TO PRISE THE BAGS FROM
MEA LAST AND AS THEY HAD AT SOME STAGE SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL
MALTREATMENT. WE SHALL THEREFORE BE MOST GRATEFUL
IF YOU WILL CONTINUE TO USE FLIGHT BA202 FOR ALL BAGS.

LEWTY

FILES
COMMUNICATIONS D
SECURITY D
NED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

BAGHDAD 200815Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO 1300 OF 20/12 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

154	RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 DEC 1971 TOP COPY NEQ 3/548/11
-----	---

MISS BECKETT'S LETTER NEQ 3/548/1 OF 14 DECEMBER: SEVERANCE.

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT NOTE ABOUT THE INTERESTS SECTION'S TERMS OF REFERENCE AGREED WITH THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR AD REFERENDUM. HE WILL DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER YOU AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED TO IT.

2. APART FROM THE OBVIOUS CHANGES SUCH AS SWEDISH FOR SWISS AND BAGHDAD FOR ALGIERS, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TEXT OF OUR DRAFT AND OF THE NOTE ENCLOSED WITH MISS BECKETT'S LETTER OF 7 DECEMBER TO MISS HUTCHINSON HAVE BEEN MADE WITH THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND:

- A. THE NOTE IN DRAFT CORRESPONDS TO THE NOTE TO WHICH THE ALGERIAN ONE WAS A REPLY. THIS ONE THEREFORE HAS TO BE PHRASED IN TERMS OF PROPOSALS THAN DECLARATIONS.
- B. A DESIRE TO MAKE IT READ SOMEWHAT LESS DISJOINTEDLY AND TO AVOID TOO MUCH "PEN OF MY AUNTERY".

3. TURNING TO THE DETAILED CHANGES:

- A. THE IRAQI NOTE AGREEING TO THE SWEDES BECOMING OUR PROTECTING POWER SEEMS THE OBVIOUS PEG TO HANG THIS NOTE ON.
- B. IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HMA AND THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WE WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSULAR RELATIONS BEING MAINTAINED WHIL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF. THE TWO AMBASSADORS THEREFORE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NOTHING CORRESPONDING TO THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE ALGERIAN NOTE, AND THAT CONSULAR SHOULD BE LISTED AMONGST THE "MATTERS" IN THE SENTENCE CORRESPONDING TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE ALGERIAN.
- C. I HAVE LEFT IN "CULTURAL" AS PART OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERESTS SECTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEPARATE EXISTENCE OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL. IT WILL PROVIDE A USEFUL UMBRELLA FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF "HUNA LONDON" ETC.
- D. STAFF NUMBERS. I SUGGEST THE INCLUSION OF THE PHRASE "OR SUCH OTHER NUMBERSRECIPROCITY" TO PROVIDE AN ELEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY SO THAT IF THERE SHOULD BE MUTUAL DESIRE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OR TYPE OF STAFF (E.G. BY AN AMA) WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES.

/E. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E. THE NEXT SENTENCE OF THE DRAFT NOTE ABOUT PERIODICAL VISITS, CONFIRMS IN WRITING THE ASSURANCES THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL GAVE TO HMA THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT COOK OF DOE RETURNING FROM TIME TO TIME. WHEN SPEAKING TO HIM AGAIN LATER I ALSO HAD IN MIND THE NEED FOR A DTMS ENGINEER FROM BEIRUT TO VISIT US, AND IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE AGREED TO THIS TOO. I HAD NOT OF COURSE SPELT OUT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT BUT HAD REFERRED TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE OFFICE EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY.

F. LISTING. THE TWO AMBASSADORS HAD EARLIER AGREED THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY FOR THE STAFF OF THE INTERESTS SECTION TO BE IDENTIFIED AS BRITISH IN THE DIPLOMATIC LIST. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED ME TO LEAVE OUT FROM THE DRAFT THE PHRASE "IN A SUB-SECTION ENTITLED 'BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION' " WHICH I HAD PUT IN PARAGRAPH 4 AFTER THE WORDS "ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY". HIS PURPOSE SEEMED TO BE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT A SWEDE WOULD BE FORMALLY IN CHARGE OF THE SECTION AND HE THEREFORE WANTED TO ALLOW HIMSELF THE GREATEST FLEXIBILITY WHEN WORKING OUT HOW WE SHOULD ALL BE LISTED.

G. THE DRAFTING OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH BUT TWO GAVE US MORE TROUBLE THAN ANYTHING ELSE. THE FIRST OBVIOUS CHANGE, THAT OF "COMPETENT IRAQI AUTHORITIES" FOR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS MADE BECAUSE ALMOST ALL THE COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT'S CONTACTS ARE WITH STATE ORGANISATIONS FOR THIS OR THAT COMMODITY. THE PURPOSE OF THE REFERENCE IN THE ALGERIAN NOTE TO DIRECT CONTACTS WAS PRESUMABLY TO ENSURE THAT OFFICIALS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DECLINE TO RECEIVE MEMBERS OF THE INTERESTS SECTION UNLESS THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE PROTECTING EMBASSY. BUT THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR AND I CONSIDERED IT PROBABLE THAT A BALD STATEMENT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS WOULD NOT (NOT) BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES, NOT FOR THE REASON MENTIONED ABOVE BUT BECAUSE THEY INSIST THAT ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS SHOULD CONDUCT ALL BUSINESS, EXCEPT ON "TECHNICAL" MATTERS THROUGH THE MFA. HENCE THE RATHER VAGUE PHRASE "APPROPRIATE DIRECT CONTACTS". THIS SHOULD ALSO COVER THE PHRASE IN THE ALGERIAN NOTE "DANS LES LIMITES DE LEURS ATTRIBUTIONS", WHOSE SIGNIFICANCE WE WERE IN ANY CASE UNABLE TO APPRECIATE.

LEWTY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED	POD
WED	PSD
OIL D	P & C D
COMMS D	CONS D
SEC D	NEWS D
CLAIMS D	

FFFFF

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 DEC 1971
NEQ 8/548/1

TOP COPY

155

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 200845Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO 1301 OF 20/12 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

MIPT: SEVERANCE.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT NOTE.

1. THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY PRESENT THEIR COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE MINISTRY'S NOTE NO 1514/1514/200 OF THE 5TH OF DECEMBER 1971 IN WHICH THE MINISTRY AGREED THAT THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ FOLLOWING THE BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND BRITAIN ON 1 DECEMBER 1971. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ALREADY GIVEN BY THE MFA, THE EMBASSY WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS FOR CARRYING OUT ITS PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES.

2. A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY TO DEAL WITH COMMERCIAL, CONSULAR, CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION MATTERS. THE FORMULA WORDS "ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, BAGHDAD" WILL APPEAR ON THE DOCUMENTS AND SEALS USED BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION TO ISSUE VISAS AND PASSPORTS AND TO PERFORM NOTARIAL ACTS.

/3. THE

Pulsen

2/3/71

1900 90T

3. THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL CONSIST OF 4 BRITISH DIPLOMATS, 2 COMMERCIAL SECRETARIES, ONE COMMERCIAL ATTACHE, AND 5 MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL STAFF, OR SUCH OTHER NUMBERS AS MAY BE AGREED ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. THE INTERESTS SECTION WILL ALSO BE PERMITTED TO RECEIVE PERIODICAL VISITS FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE APPROPRIATE BRITISH AUTHORITIES ~~STATIONED~~ ^{FROM} OUTSIDE IRAQ FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING THE BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE INTERESTS SECTION.

4. THE STAFF OF THE INTERESTS SECTION WILL ENJOY THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES GRANTED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY OF THE SAME CATEGORY. ~~FOR THIS PURPOSE,~~ THEIR NAMES WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND WILL APPEAR IN THE DIPLOMATIC LIST UNDER THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY. A LIST OF THE NAMES OF THE PRESENT STAFF OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IS ATTACHED TO THIS NOTE.

5. THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL BE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES BY WIRELESS BOTH EN CLAIR AND IN CYPHER, AND BY DIPLOMATIC POUCH.

PERMISSION WILL BE IMPLIED FOR
6. THE STAFF OF THE INTERESTS SECTION RESIDENT IN BAGHDAD ^{TO BE} ~~WILL BE CAPABLE AT ALL TIMES OF BEING REPLACED~~ ^{AT ANY TIME} ~~BY~~ OTHER OFFICERS OF THE SAME CATEGORY (PROVIDED THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER AGREED IS NOT EXCEEDED).

7. THE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL ^{BE PERMITTED} ~~HAVE THE RIGHT~~ TO MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE COMPETENT IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

8. THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE MFA WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS NOTE AND ~~CONFIRMATION OF~~ ITS AGREEMENT TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

9. THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE MINISTRY THE ASSURANCES OF THEIR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.

DIPLOMATIC.

MR D I LEWY	SECOND SECRETARY
MR R C MANSFIELD	ATTACHE (ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL)
MR W I RAE	ATTACHE (CONSULAR)
MR E J VOYSEY	ATTACHE (ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL)

NON DIPLOMATIC

MR K H JAMES
MR S J SMITH

MR J S VALENTINE
MR K B HARRIS
(VACANT)

COMMERCIAL

MR P DONOVAN	SECRETARY
(DUE TO ARRIVE IN JANUARY)	
MR D CARTWRIGHT	SECRETARY
MR D A WRIGHT	ATTACHE

LEWY

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED	POD
WED	PSD
OIL D	P & C D
COMMS D	CONS D
SEC D	NEWS D
CLAIMS D	

FFFFF

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

BAGHDAD 200920Z

CONFIDENTIAL

156
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
21 DEC 1971

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1302 OF 20 DEC 71 INFO STOCKHOLM

HMA'S TELNO 1262 : SEVERANCE AND THE BRITISH COUNCIL

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A NOTE FOR THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO DELIVER TO THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL.

2. THE NOTE WAS DRAFTED AFTER SPRINGFORD, THE BRITISH COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE HERE, HAD MADE DISCREET ENQUIRIES AS TO THE BEST MEANS OF OBTAINING ASSURANCES OF THE KIND THAT HIS CHAIRMAN DESIRED. HE THEREFORE WROTE A FORMAL LETTER TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR (COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG) AND THE TEXT IN MIFT HAS BEEN AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND SPRINGFORD.

3. IN WORDING THE NOTE WE WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT, THAT, AS YOU KNOW, THE CHANCES OF A GENUINELY SPONTANEOUS POPULAR DEMONSTRATION CONSTITUTING A THREAT TO THE COUNCIL PREMISES IS VERY SLIGHT (EXCEPT OF COURSE IN THE EVENT OF A GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER SUCH AS OCCURRED DURING THE 1963 COUP, IN WHICH CASE ANY ASSURANCES WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL USE). LIKE THE EMBASSY, IF THE COUNCIL PREMISES ARE ATTACKED, IT WILL BE WITH AT LEAST THE CONNIVANCE OF THE AUTHORITIES. AND IF THEY REALLY ARE SO MINDED, ANY ASSURANCES THEY MAY HAVE GIVEN ARE UNLIKELY TO EXERCISE MUCH RESTRAINT.

WE THEREFORE WANTED TO ENSURE THAT WE DID NOT PREJUDICE THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TO THE COUNCIL BY RAISING THEIR HACKLES UNNECESSARILY FOR THE SAKE OF TRYING TO OBTAIN A PIECE OF PAPER WHICH WOULD BE OF DOUBTFUL VALUE IF IT CAME TO THE CRUNCH.

LEWTY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
CRD
NED
COMMS D

COPIES TO:
MR PHILLIPS, BRITISH
COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY
EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 200930Z
UNCLASSIFIED



TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1303 OF 20 DEC 71 INFO STOCKHOLM.

MIPT : SEVERANCE AND THE BRITISH COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE.

THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, PRESENT THEIR COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST AN ASSURANCE ON BEHALF OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN LONDON THAT THE COUNCIL'S PREMISES AND STAFF IN BAGHDAD WILL BE GIVEN ALL NECESSARY MEASURES OF PROTECTION DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND BRITAIN ARE BROKEN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL HAS ASKED THAT THIS REQUEST BE MADE ON THE GROUNDS THAT WHILE THE CULTURAL SECTION OF THE FORMER IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON ENJOYS FULL DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND PROTECTION THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN IRAQ IS OF COURSE AN INDEPENDENT BODY WITH NO DIPLOMATIC STATUS.


A LIST OF THE STAFF AT THE BRITISH COUNCIL BAGHDAD IS ATTACHED TO THIS NOTE.

THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE MINISTRY THE ASSURANCES OF THEIR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

18 DECEMBER 1971.

/BRITISH COUNCIL

mb



BRITISH COUNCIL, BAGHDAD.

OFFICE AND CENTRE FOR ENGLISH STUDIES, WASIRIYA

TELEPHONE : 20091-3

DIRECTOR:

MR J F C SPRINGFORD OBE
8/2/3 MANSOUR CITY
TELEPHONE 514778

DEPUTY DIRECTOR:

(VACANT)
30/19/4 MANSOUR CITY.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE OFFICER

MR R E UNDERWOOD
93/8 MANSOUR CITY.

LIBRARIAN/LECTURER

MR D SPILLER
13/2/3 MANSOUR CITY.

LEWTY

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CRD
NED
COMMS D

FFFFF

2

PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/568/1

158

FM F.C.O. 201905Z

(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY ABU DHABI TELEGRAM NO.152 OF 20 DECEMBER AND TO PRIORITY CERTAIN OTHER POSTS.

159

MY GUIDANCE TEL NO.293: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CIRCULAR:

BEGINS.

1. THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT SEVERED RELATIONS WITH HMG ON 1 DECEMBER. ON 6 DECEMBER, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO PROTECT BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ AND THAT A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WOULD BE SET UP IN BAGHDAD.

2. THE ADDRESS OF THE INTERESTS SECTION IS :
THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY,
BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION,
BAGHDAD.

3. CYPHER TELE-COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD AND THE FCO CONTINUE. THERE WILL BE A WEEKLY CONFIDENTIAL BAG SERVICE, AS WELL AS A WEEKLY UNCLASSIFIED BAG. THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED THAT THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD NEED NOT INSPECT OR MONITOR OUR COMMUNICATIONS BY BAG OR WIRELESS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

CONFIDENTIAL

/(A) THEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

(A) THEIR CONTENT IS COMMERCIAL/ECONOMICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, CONSULAR OR CULTURAL:

(B) THEY CONTAIN NO POLITICAL MATTER OTHER THAN:

(1) WHAT IS INSEPARABLE FROM REPORTS UNDER THE ABOVE APPROVED HEADINGS:

(11) UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL TRANSMITTED WITHOUT COMMENT.

THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE WILL FROM TIME TO TIME RECEIVE ORALLY FROM THE HEAD OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF ALL ITS ACTIVITIES AND OF COMMUNICATIONS SENT AND RECEIVED.

4. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND POSTS ABROAD SHOULD FROM NOW ON ONLY ADDRESS, COPY OR REPEAT LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS TO THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WHEN THEIR CONTENT FALLS WELL WITHIN THE CATEGORIES DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. EVEN WITHIN THESE CATEGORIES, NO LETTERS OR TELEGRAMS WITH A CLASSIFICATION HIGHER THAN CONFIDENTIAL SHOULD BE ADDRESSED, COPIED OR REPEATED TO THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION. ANY FAILURE TO OBSERVE THESE RULES COULD CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT WITH THE SWEDES. WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT HEADS OF CHANCERY IN POSTS WHICH HAVE HITHERTO ADDRESSED, COPIED OR REPEATED CORRESPONDENCE TO BAGHDAD ON ANY SCALE, OR AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE, SHOULD ISSUE THEIR OWN INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

ENDS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
ED

-2-
CONFIDENTIAL

BY BAG

FROM FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(IG)

UNCLASSIFIED

TO CERTAIN MISSIONS GUIDANCE NO 293 OF 20 DECEMBER

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

159

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/54/1

Instructions for use

1. The following guidance may be freely and attributably used.

Background

2. On 1 December, HM Ambassador at Baghdad was summoned by the Director General of Protocol at the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs and informed that the Iraq Government was severing relations with HMG with immediate effect. The reason given was HMG's supposed collusion with the Iranian Government over the Iranian "occupation" of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs in the Southern Gulf. On 6 December, the Secretary of State said in Parliament: "Iraq has broken off relations with us for reasons which I find it very difficult to understand. I hope they will be resumed".

3. The Iraqi authorities gave HM Ambassador ten days, subsequently extended to eleven, to leave Baghdad. Other Embassy staff, including four members of the diplomatic staff and all the Service Attachés and their supporting staff, were given a fortnight. The pattern of staff to remain in Baghdad and London (see below) was suggested by the Iraqis.

4. As was announced by News Department on 6 December, Sweden has agreed to act as our protecting power in Iraq. Several members of the former British Embassy have remained in Baghdad to staff a British Interests Section in the Swedish Embassy. Mr D I Lewty, Second Secretary, heads the Section, which is operating, under the Swedish flag, in the premises of the former Chancery. It is handling visa applications as well as other consular and administrative business, and continues to deal with our small technical assistance programme, which has been unaffected by the break in relations.

5. The Commercial Section of the former Embassy, which has separate premises, continues to function as part of the British Interests Section. British commercial firms and visitors should be encouraged to act on the principle of "business as usual".
6. The British Council has not been affected by the break in relations and continues to function in Baghdad as an independent entity.
7. Afghanistan has agreed to act as Iraq's protecting power in the United Kingdom. An Iraq Interests Section, headed by Mr Husain Abdul Sattar, Second Secretary, is operating in London under the Afghan flag. The commercial and cultural sections of the former Iraq Embassy are unaffected by the break in relations.
8. This is a relatively "soft break" of diplomatic relations. The Iraqis have been willing to allow us to retain a considerable number of people in Baghdad and much of the work formerly carried on by our Embassy will continue uninterrupted. We cannot, however, yet forecast when relations are likely to be resumed.
9. We are issuing a Circular about communications and correspondence. The text will be telegraphed to some posts.

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION
GIPD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
GUIDANCE

RESTRICTED




Enter 160
BRITISH EMBASSY

STOCKHOLM

16 December 1971

3/18



Miss Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO

Dear Veronica,

ANGLO/SWEDISH MEMORANDUM (143)

1. Herr Persson has come up with a draft of a memorandum (paragraph 2 of our telegram No 392 refers). He has accepted one or two drafting amendments which I ventured to propose and although as you will see the English is not impeccable, it is fairly clear. Is something on these lines likely to be acceptable at your end?
2. Herr Persson has also told me that perhaps this memorandum should not be finalised until we have available the text of the proposed Exchange of Notes between the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I myself do not quite see the connection but for all I know Herr Persson may have a point.

*Yours sincerely,
Peter Hutchinson.*

Miss P M Hutchinson

RESTRICTED



DRAFT

Memorandum

The British Government will be asked to reimburse the Swedish Government for all costs which may arise on account of the additional activities in Iraq undertaken by the Swedish Embassy for the protection of British interests. The following costs can be anticipated:

Travelling expenses, subsistence allowances, housing costs and other extra costs which may arise as a result of Officers of the Swedish Foreign Service having to be specially sent to Iraq for attending to the handling of the British interests at the main chancery of the Swedish Embassy. Should it prove necessary to recruit staff from outside the Swedish Foreign Service to send to Baghdad for this purpose, the basic salaries of such staff members should also be reimbursed the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in addition to the costs just mentioned.

Costs for telegram and telephone traffic between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Embassy's main chancery in matters related to the protection of British interests.

Any other costs incurred by the main chancery of the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad for the proper execution of the task of the protection of British interests in Iraq, it being understood that costs for the maintenance of real estate, rents for dwellings and other premises for which contracts are running, salaries to locally employed staff which may be required, customary expenses and financial assistance to distressed British subjects will normally be borne by the British Interests Section and paid out of funds supplied by the British Government directly to this Section. Should, however, such costs be incurred by the main chancery of the Swedish Embassy, they will be charged to the British Government.

For the costs which arise at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad, the intention is to render an account of these when all the costs are known at periods that can be agreed upon later.

The Swedish Government is relieved of all financial and administrative responsibilities for the real and personal property which will remain under the direct care of the British Interests Section as well as for documents, bank accounts and cash money in the hand of the Section and for the rendering of the statements of accounts to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

/The British



The British Interests Section should provide the main chancery of the Swedish Embassy with a complete list of the members of the staff of the British Interests Section at an early date, and any subsequent changes in the composition of this staff should be notified in the same manner, their citizenship and functions to be given simultaneously.

Stockholm, December 1971.

af Sillén/HC

ARKIVEXEMPLAR

Stockholm, June 15, 1967.

skyddsmaktsuppdrag
i Irak

42

af Sillén/HC 15.6.67

a f k m t amb i

Bagdad (42)

" , B-avd. (43) } 16.6.67

Eu/von Celsing/af Sillén

a t polchefen

bitr polchefen

hr Malneus

amb Tamm

Hr Bergman

chn pol II

hr af Sillén

Your Excellency,

Nr	276		Antal bil
Ink dnr			
Avd.	Grupp	Mål	
HP	19	Ba	

exp 15.6.67

With reference to Your Excellency's letter of June 7, 1967, I have the honour to inform you that, the consent of the Government of Iraq having been obtained, the Swedish Government has agreed to undertake the protection of the persons, property and interests for which Her Majesty's Embassy in Iraq is normally responsible.

I enclose a memorandum regarding the financial aspects and would be grateful to receive your confirmation that the terms contained therein are acceptable to the British Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Minister

(Reif Solfrago)

His Excellency

The Honourable Sir Archibald Ross K.C.M.G.

Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary

and Plenipotentiary, etc., etc., etc.,

Sen 15.6.67

af Sillén/LG

KU GL. UTRIKES
DEPARTEMENTET

af Sillén/LG 15.6.67
a som bil t note britt.
amb.

Memorandum.

Bagdad

~~The British Government~~ ^{of the United Kingdom will} accept responsibility for all the costs which may ~~be incurred by the Embassy of Sweden in Iraq~~ ^{be incurred by the Embassy of Sweden in Iraq} on account of the additional activities ~~which they~~ ^{which they} undertake ~~by the Swedish Em-
bassy~~ <sup>by the Swedish Em-
bassy</sup> for the protection of British interests. ~~It would~~ ^{Such} appear that the costs ~~given below can be anticipated:~~ ^{will include in particular}

- (a) travelling expenses, subsistence allowances, housing costs and other extra costs which may ~~be incurred~~ ^{be incurred} as result of Officers in the Swedish Foreign Service having to be specially sent to Iraq for service with the British Interests Dept. of the Swedish Embassy;
- (b) costs for telegram and telephone traffic between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ^{in Sweden} and the British Interests Department of the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad;
- (c) costs which may ~~be incurred~~ ^{be incurred} in Iraq for the proper execution of the task of protection ^{properly}, for example, costs for the maintenance of real ~~estate~~ ^{estate}, rents ^{for dwell-} ~~for dwell-~~ ings and other premises ~~for which contracts are running~~ ^{are}, salaries ^{to the} locally employed staff ~~which may be required~~ ^{costs of repatriation} and financial assistance to distressed British subjects.

In order to cover the costs for the opening and operation of the British Interests Department ~~the Government of the United Kingdom will place the~~ ^{the Government of the United Kingdom will place the} sum, ~~Sw. Cr. 200,000, should~~ ^{Sw. Cr. 200,000, should} be placed as a deposit at the disposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm.

British Interests

The ~~Protection~~ Department established at the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad will be provided with funds from the letter of credit which is now at the disposal of the Embassy. ~~It is intended that~~ ^{expenditure} the Accounts of the ~~expenses~~ and income ^{of this Department} ~~may~~ ^{be} ~~incurred and received as a result of its commission~~ ^{will be} made in principle in the same manner as ~~that which~~ ^{applies} to the British ^{Diplomatic} Foreign Service. ~~The~~ Accounts will be submitted monthly to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and forwarded to the British Embassy in Stockholm by the Ministry. Reimbursement of the net expenses, which have been accounted for by Baghdad, will be requested at the same time.

^{As regards} For the costs which arise at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ^{the Swedish Government will submit} the ~~intention is to give~~ an account of these when ~~all the~~ ^{total} cost ^{is} known or - if the Swedish Government continues to act as Protecting Power for a considerable time - at ~~periods which can~~ ^{intervals} be agreed upon at a later date. The costs in question ~~would comprise~~ ^{will} include salaries to the extra staff who ~~is found necessary~~ ^{may have} to be recruited to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm ^{to assist in} ~~for~~ conducting the task of protection.

Stockholm, June 15, 1967.

161

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
22 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

TOP COPY

PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

RESTRICTED

FM STOCKHOLM 211515Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 399 OF 21 DECEMBER

BAGHDAD TELNO 1331 TO F C O: SEVERANCE.

1. WE HAVE HANDED OVER TEXT OF TWO DRAFT NOTES TO M F A MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE AD REFERENDUM. THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED THEM DIRECT AND WERE GRATEFUL.

2. CHRISTMAS EVE IS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY IN SWEDEN SO IF WE ARE TO ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THE TERMS OF THE NOTES WITH THE SWEDES BEFORE THE HOLIDAY WE SHALL NEED INSTRUCTIONS VERY SOON.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N EAST D	POD
WED	PSD
OIL D	P & C D
COMMS D	CONS D
SECURITY D	NEWS D
CLAIMS D	

RESTRICTED

Reply sent

mb 23/12

Mr White (Finance Department)

Mrs ~~Dey~~ (Legal Advisers) Recd 11/1
to VB on 10/1

Anglo/Swedish Memorandum

1. Can you agree to the terms of the draft enclosed with Miss Hutchinson's letter of 16 December? I have attached the 1967 memorandum for reference.

Beckett
NED

23/12.

P.S.D.

A - ~~SD~~ (Mr Kemble)

Comms D (Mr Routledge)

I should be grateful to know whether you have any comments.

Beckett
10/1

The terms of the draft are

acceptable to me. We must accept
that expenditure incurred by the Swedish
government on our behalf is a proper
charge to public funds.

As for the mechanics of dealing
with this expenditure, I believe it would be
better if the Accountant in Bangladesh
could pay as much as possible through his
account; the Locally engaged staff of the
Embassy are still in full force and his
Accounts officer is able to cope (we have
this assurance from Finance Department). If
the Swedish government prefers to submit bills
for everything, however, I would not press
the point.

H. C. Walker
12/1/72 P.S.D

I have nothing to add. The Department accept the
charges for accommodation.

✓ Kumble.
13.1.72

A + S. Dept.

Miss Beckett
(NED-W133)


BAGHDAD : ANGLO/SWEDISH MEMORANDUM

1 With reference to your minute of 23 December, 1971, the procedure is that the expenditure of the protecting power on the various items mentioned in the draft Memorandum will be charged to the appropriate subheads of the Diplomatic Service Vote (i.e. the FCO will treat the expenditure by the Swedes as though it is expenditure by one of our own posts).

2 I see no objection from Finance Department's point of view to the draft but would suggest that Personnel Services, Accommodation and Communications Departments should, in due course, be made aware of its contents.

3 Am I correct in assuming that the Swedish Government will only seek reimbursement of actual expenditure and that no question of our paying a fee for their services arises?

4 Would NED please ensure that Finance Department is kept informed about all matters pertaining to the financial and accounting aspects of the protecting power's activities on our behalf.



E G White
Finance Dept-CH501

4 January 1972

copy: XF file

Miss Beckett-

The substance seems fine. I have suggested on the photocopy below some changes which in the interests of elegance might be made to the English.

S. J. L. S. J. L. S.
6 January.

Miss Beckett (NEO W133)

1. I have noted para. 2 of Mr. White's minute of 4 January, and I have nothing further to add.

Callan
(J.H. Callan)

Communication Dept.

K106 MA 403.

13 January, 1972.

4 January 1972

copy: XE file

Mr. Callan

The information is for the
Department of the Treasury
and is to be used for the
purpose of the study.

Callan

NEQ 3/548/1
162

PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

FM FCO 221215Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM (161) TEL NO. 216 OF 22 DECEMBER 1971 INFO BAGHDAD.
YOUR TEL NO. 399: SEVERANCE.

1. WE ARE LOOKING CAREFULLY AT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT NOTE IN
BAGHDAD TEL NO. 1301 FROM THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW. WE ARE NOT
(NOT) SURE WHETHER WE SHALL BE ABLE TO LET YOU HAVE INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE THE HOLIDAY. BUT OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO BE ENTIRELY
SURE ABOUT THE WORDING AND WE THINK AGREEMENT WITH THE SWEDES
ON THE TERMS OF THE NOTE COULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER CHRISTMAS.

2. WE SEE YOU HAVE HANDED OVER THE TEXT OF THE TWO NOTES. PRE-
SUMABLY THE SECOND IS THAT CONTAINED IN BAGHDAD TEL NO. 1303 (157)
ABOUT THE BRITISH COUNCIL. WE HAD ASSUMED THAT, AS A DATE APPEARED
AT THE END OF THE TEXT, THIS NOTE HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED.
PERHAPS BAGHDAD COULD CONFIRM. WE CAN SEE NO OBJECTION TO ITS
TERMS NOR TO THE FACT THAT IT HAS ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED WITHOUT
REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

F I L E S:

NED

CRD

&&&&

RESTRICTED

ph

TOP COPY

163

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 230850Z
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
REGISTRY N. 9
29 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1309 OF 23 DEC 71.

YOUR TELNO 1435 OF 22 DECEMBER TO CAIRO.

1. I WAS OF COURSE MOST INTERESTED TO SEE MUSCAT TELNO 448 WHICH YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE REPEATED HERE. BUT I AM NOT CLEAR HOW OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE SWEDES CAN BE STRETCHED TO COVER RECEIPT OF A TELEGRAM LIKE IT.


LEWY

FILES
ARAB D
FUSD
NED
NEWS D
COMMS D
SIR W LUCE
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Reply by letter
p/ls 21/12

EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 240845Z
UNCLASSIFIED



TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 1314 OF 24 DEC 71 INFO STOCKHOLM.

162
YOUR TELNO 216 TO STOCKHOLM : SEVERANCE.

1. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO NEED TO HURRY AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS OF THE NOTE ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERESTS SECTION IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD DELIVER IT EARLY IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 2 JANUARY (WHICH IS THE DATE THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR RETURNS FROM POST-XMAS LEAVE). THIS IS BECAUSE WE SHALL HAVE TO SEND THE PASSPORT OF ONE OF THE CHILDREN ON A SCHOOL HOLIDAY VISIT HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE MFA FOR AN EXIT AND RE-ENTRY VISA IN TIME FOR HER RETURN JOURNEY ON 9 JANUARY. SINCE SHE WILL HAVE TO BE DESCRIBED AS A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY, IT WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF DELAY IF THE MFA HAD AT LEAST BEEN FORMALLY NOTIFIED OF OUR EXISTENCE AND STATUS. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE NOT YET ASKED FOR THE RESIDUAL STAFFS VISAS, CAR NUMBER PLATES, ETC TO BE AMENDED.

2. ALTHOUGH WHEN DRAFTING THE NOTE ABOUT THE COUNCIL WE DID NOT CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO REFER IT TO GOVERNMENTS, I THOUGHT, AFTER DESPATCHING MY TELNO 1303, THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HOLD UP DELIVERY OF THE NOTE IN CASE YOU HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO ITS CONTENTS. SO IT HAS STILL NOT BEEN DELIVERED.

157
APOLOGIES FOR ANY CONFUSION.

LEWTY

FILES

NED
CRD

Action in
hand

pr 163/12

CONFIDENTIAL

165



RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 29 DEC 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
--

BRITISH EMBASSY,
STOCKHOLM.

17 December 1971

A D Parsons Esq CMG MVO MC
FCO

Mr Ege
then p. 12
3 1/2
Mrs Bennett
Enter.

I must speak to the
Swedes.

Dear Tony
I R A Q

1. Thank you so much for your¹² letter of 14 December. I am very glad that you were pleased with the outcome of the negotiations with the Swedes. Patricia Hutchinson did a heroic job and all the other staff involved also rose to the occasion splendidly. I hope that the conditions which the Swedes have laid down about being kept informed of the contents of our telegrams, etc. will not cause you any trouble.

2. I am very glad that you are going to express our thanks to the Swedish Ambassador. The Secretary of State mentioned it at the end of his talk with Wickman, but he had to leave for a meeting at No. 10 and the Swedes were rising to their feet, so I am not sure that it quite came across.

B/u to me
10 Jan. p. 10
has our Guy.

RESTRICTED



ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

166

21 December 1971

Miss V E Beckett
Near Eastern Department
F C O

Mr Gutter
Mr Evans R.E.
Mr Lewy seems to have things well in hand.

Copies sent

Dear Veronica

Copy to: EPD, Canon Dept, Mr V Dept, CRD, Mr Cook ODA, Col Gifford POD, Def Dept.

K 29/12

INTERESTS SECTION

1. I had hoped to let you have an account of our doings in the bag last week-end, but missed the deadline, I fear. As it is one or two comments will have to wait until the next BOAC flight which is on 1 January.
2. We are of course trying to carry on business as usual as far as possible, and within the limits of ~~our~~ agreement with the Swedes. The Administration Section are naturally the hardest worked at the moment. The Commercial Office have been concentrating, by means of personal visits, on telling people that they are still here and open for business. The Consular section is now issuing about 20 visas a day. The figures fluctuate rather widely from day to day, so it is too early to draw firm conclusions, but this figure is slightly higher than that of the same period last year. The British Council are carrying on as before.
- Good.* 3. The Iraqi authorities, and notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have gone out of their way to be helpful. The BCO were refused a copy of a tender document by one Ministry a few days ago, but this decision was quickly reversed. When Donald Cartwright called at the Director General of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Economy later, he was assured that this must have been an exceptional case of excess of zeal (cp the Iraqi consul in Kuwait?). The only problem we have with the authorities at the moment is over the British Council's new bus. The Council have been using it for 3 months (having sold their old one), but their application for an import licence for it has been turned down, with no reasons given. The Swedish Ambassador has agreed to mention the matter when he calls on the Chief of Protocol to deliver the Note about the Council (our telno 1303).
4. It is too soon to assess whether the technical assistance programme will keep up its momentum. We sent two people off on 16 December (for Educational TV ~~Production~~) and we have a Civil Aviation trainee booked out on the 23rd, but their applications were of course lodged long before the break. When we received your telegram, I telephoned a desk officer in the Technical Cooperative

no 1281

.../Department

RESTRICTED



Department and told him that we wished the Technical Assistance programme to continue. I shall try to call on Miss Sirriya al-Khoja (the Director General) soon to give her the same message, since she will now be engaged upon allocating the requests to the various donor countries (my letter 6/16 of 24 November to John Cook in the ODA). I have asked the Embassy in Beirut to resume their supply of articles (in Arabic) and plates for distribution to the newspapers here. There were only 6 a week, and they were always non-controversial - fashion, sport, etc. so I do not think the Swedish Ambassador will raise any objections when I ask him. The West Germans do the same.

5. I am sorry I have not hitherto been able to do much more in the political field (as defined by ~~an~~ agreement with the Swedes) than send you the Baghdad Observer. I realise this makes filing and copying rather a chore for you, and have made ~~an~~ appropriate New Year Resolution!

6. Before he left Lionel Harrod prepared a list of military training courses on which the Iraqis had been allocated places during 1972. If the Iraqis wish to send people on these courses they will obviously have to come up pretty soon with some ideas about how their candidates for them are going to be assessed if there are no Attaches here. I have therefore asked the Swedish Ambassador to agree to a Note on these lines going to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hope that he can regard it as a slightly out of the ordinary case of technical assistance.

7. Happy Christmas.

Yours ever

(an

D I Lewty

c.c. Chancery STOCKHOLM

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

No need
to follow this
up if
the Iraqis
don't
respond.
of

NEQ 1548/1
(167)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

D I Lewty Esq
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date 29 December 1971

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1309

1. Sorry, this was a mistake. The Circular about communications with Baghdad hasn't yet percolated through to everybody, but I am trying to speed it up.


Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

ph

CONFIDENTIAL

168

Circular 'O' 255/71
" 'A' 222/71
NEQ 3/548/1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London

21 December 1971

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ: COMMUNICATIONS

1. The Iraq Government severed relations with HMG on 1 December. On 6 December, it was announced that the Swedish Government had agreed to protect British interests in Iraq and that a British Interests Section would be set up in Baghdad.
2. The address of the Interests Section is:
The Royal Swedish Embassy,
British Interests Section,
Baghdad.
3. Cypher tele-communications between the British Interests Section in Baghdad and the FCO continue. There will be a weekly confidential bag service, as well as a weekly unclassified bag. The Swedish Government has agreed that the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad need not inspect or monitor our communications by bag or wireless, on the understanding that:
 - a) their content is commercial/economical, administrative, consular or cultural;
 - b) they contain no political matter other than:
 - i. what is inseparable from reports under the above approved headings;
 - ii. unclassified material transmitted without comment.
- The Swedish Ambassador or his representative will from time to time receive orally from the Head of the British Interests Section a general account of all its activities and of communications sent and received.
4. Government Departments and posts abroad should from now on only address, copy or repeat letters and telegrams to the British Interests Section

CONFIDENTIAL

pub 31/12

CONFIDENTIAL

when their content falls well within the categories defined in paragraph 3 above. Even within these categories, no letters or telegrams with a classification higher than Confidential should be addressed, copied or repeated to the British Interests Section. Any failure to observe these rules could cause us embarrassment with the Swedes. We therefore suggest that Heads of Chancery in posts which have hitherto addressed, copied or repeated correspondence to Baghdad on any scale, or as a matter of routine, should issue their own instructions on the subject.

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

DISTRIBUTION:

All Posts (not Dependent Territories)

Home 'A'

Whitehall Distribution

CONFIDENTIAL

Mrs Denza

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. I should be grateful for your views on the following points:

Flag A

- a. Afghan Note Verbale of 14 December. Presumably we should reply to this and I attach a draft based on our reply to the Pakistanis in 1967. Can you agree to this?

Flag B

- b. Miss Hutchinson's letter of 14 December. Do you think an Anglo/Swedish memorandum is necessary? We signed one in 1967, and I suppose if the Swedes insist on one this time we must agree. But I would not have thought it was essential and suggest that we take no initiative on this.

Flag C

Flags D & E
Flag F

- c. Baghdad telegrams Nos 1300 and 1301. The draft note is based on the one used in 1965 when the Swiss protected our interests in Algiers. Mr Lewty's proposals seem to me very sensible. My only comment is on the passage in brackets in paragraph 6 of his telegram No 1301: does this in any way conflict with the penultimate sentence of paragraph 3 which suggests that the total personnel of the Interests Section may be increased if necessary?

Veronica Beckett

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

21 December 1971

Enc

This Beckett

(a) Yes. Agree with your draft.
(b) Agree. It seems the Swedes are drafting this.

(c) I made some minor drafting amendments

as the text of the telegram.

There is no great obstacle to maintaining consular relations where diplomatic relations are broken off. This was done in several countries in 1967.

Your guidance says that "relations" were being severed, which does suggest that consular relations were included. If you check the text of any written communication from them and are not sure of the position I suggest you ask the Swedes to ask the Iraqis. If consular relations are to be maintained you should reinsert in the draft a passage based on the Algerian model. The Ambassadors in Iraq obviously thought all relations were being broken.

John Dinger
22 December.

4. To follow the course suggested in the draft telegram is tantamount to accepting that consular relations have been severed because Mr Rae would merely be acting as an official of the Swedish Embassy. Although he could technically perform all the routine consular tasks, apart from the performance of notarial acts, he could not levy British Diplomatic Service fees for services rendered and should either forward applications for visas and passports to Beirut or instruct applicants to apply direct there. Paragraph 2 of the draft Note in Baghdad telegram to FCO No 1301 would require amendment. It will also be necessary to issue a special authority to Mr Rae to register births and deaths in the Consular Registers and to issue an Order in Council under the Oaths and Evidence (Overseas Authorities and Countries) Act 1963 empowering the diplomatic or consular representative of Sweden to administer oaths and perform notarial acts.

5. We could of course follow course "b" above and assume that Mr Rae continued to function as British Vice-Consul. If this course is adopted I suggest that we add to paragraph 2 of the draft Note the words:-

"... and [in order to satisfy United Kingdom internal law] Mr William Innes Rae will continue to sign as British Vice-Consul."

A separate enquiry could be made later as to whether Mr Rae could perform a consular marriage.

H V Richardson

H V RICHARDSON
Nationality & Treaty Dept
CL 537 Main A 364

30 December 1971

I remain opposed to seeking clarification from the Iraqis (course c). But course b) + para 5 above would I think be acceptable. Do you agree? If so I will redraft the telegram.

Reckitt 30/12

*Would this
be such a
disadvantage?*

*Is this so
very difficult?*

4/69

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr Thornton (Consular Dept)
 Mr Richardson (Nationality & Treaty Dept)
 Mrs Denza (Legal Advisers Department)

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Flyp Dr E

1. Please see Baghdad telegrams nos 1300 and 1301, and minutes by Mrs Denza and myself immediately below.
2. I now attach a draft telegram to Stockholm: I have discussed the lines of this with all addressees of this minute (as well as with Mr Balfour Paul) and have done my best to express the consensus of opinion. I should be grateful for any comments.
3. If possible I should like to despatch this telegram by the end of this month.

Veronica Beckett

Veronica Beckett
 Near Eastern Department

23 December 1971

I am sure this is right: we should leave the consular question as open as possible, but avoid involvement in any functions which might have tricky legal implications or complications later. I would definitely be against authorising consular marriages at the moment.

C Thornton

29/12/71.

Miss Beckett (Near Eastern Dept (W.133))

Mrs Dezza (Legal Advisers (K194))

1. I am afraid I do not agree with the course of action proposed. To my mind the following courses are open to us;-

- a. to accept that consular relations have been broken;
- b. to assume that they have not been broken because Mr Rae, the British Vice-Consul, has been allowed to stay;
- c. to seek clarification from the Iraqis.

I would prefer that course "c" should be followed.

2. There are a number of precedents for the retention of consular relations even though diplomatic relations have been severed. In addition to the Algerian precedent referred to, consular relations were retained when the United Arab Republic broke diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and later when they broke diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over Rhodesia. When I was first appointed to Cairo I was HM Consul but a First Secretary in the British Interests Section of the Canadian Embassy. It appears from paragraph 3 (b) of Baghdad telegram No 1302 to the FCO of 20 December that the reason Baghdad have not included a paragraph on consular relations in the proposed Note is that HM Ambassador and the Swedish Ambassador could not understand the significance of consular relations being maintained. However, if Mr Rae does not remain British Vice-Consul, he will not (a) be able to perform notarial acts (b) have any legal powers to levy fees (c) be able to register births or deaths - without special authorisation by the Secretary of State - under Regulation 14(1) of the Registration of Births (Consular Officers) Regulations 1948.

3. In view of the fact that the Iraqis have agreed that the British Council could stay after first indicating that it should depart, I think the Iraqis may well agree to the continuance of consular relations if it were explained that they are necessary for our purposes in order that Mr Rae can perform notarial acts and issue visas. If consular relations are not maintained it will be necessary for Iraqis to apply in Beirut for any visas they require. Although Dr Thornton mentions the fact that she is against authorising all consular marriages at the moment, there are two applications for such marriages in Baghdad pending at the moment. Mr Mitchell, the former Consul in Baghdad, told me that there are strong compassionate grounds why we should agree, if possible, to one of them.

Confidential.

Reference

169

Mr Gertan

Severance.

Flags DRE

1. You will see from Baghdad telegrams nos 1300 and 1301 and minutes below that the question of Consular relations with Iraq is causing problems. I have redrafted my telegram to Stockholm in the light of the minuting, and will now have to go back to Dr. Thornton, Mr Richardson and Mrs Denza. Before doing so I should be most grateful ~~to~~ if you would look at these pp and let me know whether you agree with the line now proposed.

2. I had hoped to get the telegram off today, but I certainly want to do so before I go on leave on Monday evening.

Beckett

Miss Beckett

31/12

P1. speak.

② I think the main problem will be to sell this to the Swedes, who may have strong

strong news, given that
both Amb. Gernig & Amb.
Balfour. Paul seem to have
been firmly under the impression
(when negotiating the arguments
between 1-11 Dec) that all relations
had been broken. See my proposed
amdt to §4 of yr tl.

3. Secondly, what about
reciprocity? The Iraqis will
certainly ask at some point, when
they have studied the Swedish note,
whether their Consul is to have
fully independent facilities & status
in London, i.e. no Afghan plate
over his door, & no Afghan notepaper
or "parallel stamps" in his nationals (&
other) passports serviced by him. Do we
concede this, & if so, might not the Iraqis justifiably
claim that we were already trying to resume relations with
them? 31/12

**N.B. The
UPGRADE**

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) 

Date 2/3/77

DEPT.
or POST

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NE Q 3/548/1 ✓ (Part C) / (134-169)

TITLE: POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ

[illegible]

N.B. The grade
UPGRADE

YEAR STAMP

1971

(LAST PAPER)

Severance

Two tels despatched after agreement with:

Dr Thornton

Mr Richardson

Mrs Denson

Caus. Dept Legal Adviser

Mr Egeron

Mr Evans.

pr 16 3/1

(LAST PAPER)

Sweden's Agreement To Protect British Interests In Iraq; Afghan Embassy In London To Protect Iraqi Interests. Political-Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq And UK. 8 Dec. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1541. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477258/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=340e2c9c&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.